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Philosophy 
Anyone who discusses the possibility of an artistic medium doing philosophy must begin by saying 
something about what they take philosophy to be.  Drawing on a recent debate in philosophy of 
film, two central positions on the issue can be outlined (Wartenberg 2006).  One emphasizes that 
philosophy is an academic discipline that features the articulation and debate of arguments on 
specific conceptual issues.  If a film or a dance cannot advance arguments on an issue then, on this 
account, they cannot do philosophy.  A more expansive understanding of philosophy, however, 
holds that a philosopher need not develop a specific argument—complete with a thesis, supporting 
evidence, and conclusion—but may provide significant insight and stimulate reflection on 
conceptual issues.  Martin Heidegger’s work falls within this category as it provides a great deal of 
insight into the human existential condition which in turn encourages the reader to consider his or 
her own experience.  Similarly, a film or dance may provide insight on philosophical concepts by 
embodying them and possibly by pushing them beyond their original formulation in a way that 
fosters reflection on the part of the viewer.  For example, William Forsythe’s dance installation 
Human Writes (2012) uniquely performs the tension that exists between a political ideal and the 
practical difficulties that arise when trying to universalize it.  It also fosters criticism of the 
inconsistent manner in which industrialized nations, often because of economic or political 
reasons, do not take enough steps to ensure that the basic human rights of many who live in 
developing countries are sufficiently protected.  In this way, Human Writes embodies a key idea 
from contemporary political philosophy and encourages audience members to critically assess 
that ideal.   
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However, I would like to shift attention away from the philosophical import of completed dance 
works such as Human Writes and focus on dance processes that are often used to develop them in 
the studio.  From this perspective the relationship has less to do with the philosophical content—
such as universal human rights—that dances may advance and more to do with creative dance 
processes that can be used advance philosophical inquiry into the nature of human embodiment.  
In the remainder of this essay I will argue that the dancer is doing philosophy when he or she is 
using dance technique to consciously foster new somaesthetic experience and to actively 
investigate the manner in which embodied experience is influenced by particular social values.  The 
first component of my argument draws on pragmatist philosophy and more specifically on the 
work of Richard Shusterman, while the second draws on concepts advanced by Michel Foucault 
and Susan Bordo.  
With regard to methodology, dance philosophy can emphasize the first-hand experience of making 
and performing dances and it can, in a more analytical fashion, engage with conceptual issues 
raised by those practices.  The philosophical approach that I use to investigate Gaga and Contact 
Improvisation is pragmatist in that it emphasizes the manner in which the experiential and the 
reflective phases of experience mutually inform one another.  One could take a more analytical 
approach to the dance techniques discussed here (for example, see McFee 1992; Bunker et al. 
2013) or a more continental approach (for example, see Hall 2012; LaMothe 2015; McCormack 
2014) and since I believe that discussions informed by those approaches would reveal important 
insights, I will include references to relevant literature through the course of the essay.      
Regardless of methodological commitments, I believe that it is important for dance philosophers 
to be quite specific about the dance practices that they are considering.  Nietzsche famously 
suggested that philosophers can be dancers but it is quite unclear what he took dancing to be 
([1883] 1978, 107–110).  Was he thinking of vernacular forms such as folk dance?  Or dance for the 
concert stage such as pantomime or classical ballet?  More generally, was he thinking of 
choreographed or improvised dance?  These questions are largely rhetorical but they point to the 
fact that historical and contemporary philosophers often refer quite generally to dancing because 
they have rudimentary understandings of the wide range of dance practices characteristic of dance 
education, choreography, and performance.  But if we are going to consider the manner in which 
dance qua dance can do philosophy, then generalities must be avoided and the philosophical 
import of specific dance practices considered.  For this reason, this essay considers the intersection 
of two specific dance improvisation techniques and self-reflective embodied research and it 
primarily references the work of dance scholars who have first-hand experience with dance 
practice. 
Somaesthetic Inquiry     
Drawing on the pragmatist philosophy of John Dewey, Richard Shusterman developed the field of 
somaesthetics which theoretically and practically investigates the manner in which the body 
functions as a source of aesthetic experience (Shusterman 2000, 262–283).  Throughout his career, 
Dewey consistently argued against mind-body dualism and emphasized that individuals can grow 
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to the extent that they can develop intelligent physical and mental habits that mediate the 
problematic situations that arise in daily life ([1925] 1958).  Further, in his later work he emphasized 
that aesthetic experience can arise in a range of day-to-day activities and is not restricted to 
encounters with fine art housed in galleries and museums.  On his account, fine arts such as dance 
clarify and intensify the energies that culminate in aesthetic experience in everyday life such as 
when we cook a meal, exercise, have a robust conversation with friends, enjoy a soccer game, or 
hike a mountain trail (Alexander 1987, Dewey [1932] 2005).  Shusterman develops this approach 
by considering the manner in which a range of body practices from different cultural traditions can 
be practiced in order to consciously create rich and varied somaesthetic experience for 
practitioners (2010, 262–338).  This meliorist approach emphasizes that bodily experience is not a 
given but can be intentionally developed such that new aesthetic experiences can be cultivated 
and appreciated by the individual.  How does dance practice then, fall within this program?  
Dance is like yoga, tai chi chuan, martial arts, running, and sport in that it provides a systematic 
framework that contextualizes a practitioner’s cultivation of new somaesthetic experiences.  Yoga, 
for example, includes a system of exercises that are designed to realize specific psycho-physical 
goals.  The system allows one to experience novel proprioceptive sensations as one cultivates its 
specific poses, movement sequences, breathing techniques, and general meditative focus (Mullis 
2015).  The consequent increase in whole-body endurance strength, flexibility, and integration of 
mind, body, and breath allows the practitioner to aesthetically appreciate what may for them 
bodily experiences that may be indicative of a new mode of embodiment.  
One may agree that this indeed is a first-hand embodied investigation into somaesthetic 
experience but disagree that it is properly philosophical in nature since it does not present or 
advance specific philosophical ideas in the manner described above.  There are two ways to reply 
to this.  The first is to point to eastern practices that manifest distinct philosophical traditions and 
their respective philosophies of embodiment.  Modern Postural Yoga is historically connected with 
Ayurvedic medicine and a philosophy of embodiment that is conceptually intertwined with classical 
Hindu philosophy (Singleton 2010).  Tai chi is based in concepts drawn from classical Daoist 
philosophy, most eastern martial traditions embody aspects of Confucian ethics, and many body 
practices that developed in Japan—such as the tea ceremony—physically express ideas central to 
Zen Buddhism (Schmeig 2004).  But with this said, many practitioners of these body traditions do 
not place much stake on the philosophies that were seminal to their development and, further, 
there are many somaesthetic practices—such as sport, hiking, running, and eating—that do not 
manifest aspects of particular philosophical traditions. 
The second and more substantial reply to the skeptic entails drawing attention to the manner in 
which a somaesthetic practice can be philosophical if it leads the practitioner to engage in self-
reflection about general characteristics of his or her embodied experience.  When this occurs, he 
or she begins to consider personal and cultural factors that fostered the development of his 
particular mode of embodiment which in turn allows him to consider alternatives.  This is 
philosophical for three reasons.  
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The first is that it entails a level of self-understanding consistent with the Socratic dictum to “know 
thyself.”  It will be remembered that Socrates had a high degree of self-knowledge concerning his 
lack of epistemic certainty and that the Platonic dialogues demonstrate that Socrates’ interlocutors 
lacked this kind of self-knowledge as they unknowingly held many beliefs that could not withstand 
logical scrutiny.  Although it has less to do with epistemic consistency, an important component of 
Shusterman’s (2008) work concerns the manner in which a range of more contemporary 
philosophers had troubling relationships with their own bodies, relationships that often 
unknowingly influenced their philosophies of embodiment.  Shusterman’s discussion of the 
relationship between the biographies of philosophers such as William James, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Simone De Beauvoir, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty and their respective understandings of 
embodiment provides a critical foundation for an approach that does not view embodied 
experience as a given.  More specifically, this aspect of Shusterman’s work demonstrates that the 
understandings of the body articulated by these philosophers were unknowingly inflected by a 
range of specific cultural values that they took as given and this observation in turn encourages 
readers to self-reflectively consider the manner in which personal experience within a particular 
cultural context has shaped their own experience of embodiment. 
This critical self-reflection leads us to the second reason why somaesthetics is philosophical in 
nature, namely, the manner in which critical somaesthetics opens to door to intelligent self-
fashioning outlined by John Dewey.  Dewey ([1922] 2002) emphasized that experience becomes 
increasingly meaningful when the individual develops an array of mental and physical habits that 
allow her to pursue the experience of a plurality of value within an ever-changing physical and 
social environment.  Once she considers the manner in which particular cultural values have 
shaped her mode of embodiment, she can then consider how different body practices can allow 
her to pursue increasingly rich somaesthetic experience.  Dewey advocated for the work of 
Frederick Matthias Alexander whose Alexander Technique teaches individuals to become aware of 
unnecessary muscular tension and postural problems that occur while performing everyday 
activities (Dalton 2002, 82-86).  Because of a history or repeated usage, the individual’s perceptions 
of muscular tension, relaxation, and postural integrity may be skewed and the Alexander technique 
allows the practitioner to cultivate increasingly accurate physical perceptions.  In turn, this makes 
possible somaesthetic experiences that previously lay outside of the practitioner’s somatic 
framework.  Dewey advocated for the Alexander technique because it practically demonstrated 
how habits can be rendered intelligible and how that process can foster the pursuit or a plurality 
of value that renders the individual’s experience richer and more meaningful. 
To recap the previous two points, somaesthetic practices can do philosophy if the individual who 
engages them develops a self-reflective inquiry into their embodied experience to the extent that 
it plays into a broader project of cultivating the experience of a plurality of value.  Further, 
somaesthetics is philosophical in nature because it fosters an embodied understanding of the 
general manner in which the body structures human experience.  Through embodied practice and 
reflection I learn about the possibilities of somaesthetic experience for myself and this leads me 
to consider the experience of those who engage in body practices that I have little experience with 
and perhaps find quite odd.  I learn of the wide range of embodied experience which in turn 
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encourages me to consider the general plasticity of the human body, the nature and function of 
habit, and the relationship between the body and the self.  If the preceding points are correct, 
somaesthetics does philosophy when it advances an active experiential research into human 
embodiment.  But again, what does this have to do with dance?   
If we return to Dewey’s point about the relationship between fine art and aesthetic experience in 
everyday life, we find that dance as a fine art refines and expresses energies that arise in the course 
of daily life.  This occurs because dancers generally master expressive dance technique that allows 
them to clarify the movements of the body, to articulately express somatic energy into 
performance spaces, and to develop a performative presence that increases the significance of 
their postures and actions.  In the studio, the end of any particular action is ultimately artistic 
expression whereas in day to day life the end of an action is contextualized by specific projects 
such as getting to work, finishing an assignment, teaching class, and so on.  As discussed, dance is 
like other body practices that provide practical and theoretical frameworks that can ground the 
cultivation of rich somaesthetic experience, however, it is unique in that the dancer’s mode of 
embodiment is developed in the studio so that it ultimately may realize the artistic ends.  For this 
reason, the techniques utilized by dancers remain distinct from those of other body practices since 
such techniques are intertwined with the process of variously giving form to artistic content.  In 
order to make this point clearer, I will go beyond generalities and discuss two improvisation 
techniques that I have studied in the studio and that can be utilized by dance artists to generate 
aesthetically expressive movement. 
Improvisational Technique  
Gaga 
Gaga technique was developed by the current director of the Batsheva Dance Company, Ohad 
Naharin who studied ballet and modern dance early in his dance career.  In the early 2000s he 
developed a systematic approach to dance improvisation that can be practiced by dancers and 
non-dancers alike (Aldor 2003, 92–94).  Gaga classes are divided into two categories: “Gaga Dancers” 
which offers professional dancers the opportunity to incorporate Gaga movement principles into 
their existing dance practice and “Gaga People” which can be practiced by anyone interested in 
investigating the possibilities of expressive movement.  Gaga technique has several components 
but I will focus on two that are common to both Gaga Dancers and Gaga People and which are 
most pertinent for this essay: the kinesthetic pleasure of improvised organic movement and the 
phenomenological investigation of somatic textures. 
Gaga is an improvisation technique that emphasizes un-planned movement instead of pre-set 
choreographic patterns and sequences.  Sessions generally begin with “floating” in which the 
practitioner imagines that the body is surrounded by water.  This simultaneously produces a sense 
of physical support and gentle sense of ease in the body which the instructor develops by 
encouraging students to explore the manner in which imagined currents of water can move 
specific parts of the body and, via kinetic chains, affect the body as a whole.  In this way the 
imagination is used to create a mode of embodiment that is characterized by flowing, integrated 
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movement.  This leads Naharin to emphasize that Gaga includes a therapeutic component in that 
it entails accepting the body as is instead of molding it into codified technique that is designed to 
realize particular choreographic ends (2006: 53). 
In daily life we generally experience somatic pleasure as we engage in physical practices with 
particular goals in mind.  However, the goal of floating is to simply enjoy moving in an imaginative 
and exploratory fashion which—not unlike other dance improvisation techniques—fosters a non-
narrowly instrumental relationship to the body.  The dancer’s attention is attuned on the 
phenomenological experience of the movement because her imagination actively contextualizes 
the movement and because she experiments with non-habitual movements that require more 
attention to execute (for phenomenological approaches to dance movement, see Fraleigh 1996; 
Sheets-Johnstone 2015).  
A second and related aspect of Gaga technique is the cultivation of the experience of a range of 
somatic textures.  In daily life the musculature of the body generally manifests limited degrees of 
tension and relaxation and Gaga asks practitioners to use their imaginations to intentionally 
experience a broader range of somatic texture.  Floating fosters a sense of somatic liquidity and 
this can be developed further by imagining that specific surfaces of the body are hard as armor, 
that they are elastic in the manner of stretchy materials with different degrees of elasticity, or that 
the limbs are masses of concrete.  Further, one can explore variations in the transitions from one 
texture to another as well as variations in the rate of transition.  Time is spent investigating how 
different somatic textures somaesthetically reveal somatic surface and depth and how they more 
generally affect improvised movement quality (for more on the phenomenological experience of 
surface and depth in dance, see Kozel 2007, 28–40).  
I have been focusing on two components of Gaga technique that can be practiced by dancers and 
non-dancers alike.  Professional dancers can use floating and somatic textures purely for 
movement exploration purposes but in addition these strategies can be used to create 
choreography that can be incorporated into dance pieces.  Indeed, in many of the pieces that are 
included in Batsheva’s repertory, one finds dancers floating and manifesting dramatic changes in 
somatic textures.  This and other components of the approach produce a distinctive somaesthetic 
style that assists in the expression of Naharin’s choreographic sequences.  Regardless, I would like 
to emphasize that the dancer or non-dancer who invests in Gaga technique is executing an 
experiential philosophical investigation of embodiment as described in the previous section.   
Instead of taking the experience of embodiment as a given, the improvisation technique allows the 
dancer to imaginatively experiment with movements that create new somaesthetic experiences.  
Gaga reveals that the investigation can be therapeutic in nature and it demonstrates that it can be 
developed in order to create choreography for the concert stage.   
Contact Improvisation  
I would like to consider another improvisation technique that was developed in the 1970s by Steve 
Paxton and that can be used for experiential or performative ends—Contact Improvisation (CI).  
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Whereas Gaga focuses primarily on one’s internal somaesthetic experience, CI necessarily involves 
a partner and thereby requires one to focus on physical interactions with another.   
As the name implies, CI generally emphasizes remaining in contact with one’s partner as various 
surfaces of the body are used to articulate spontaneous and cooperative movement sequences.  
Partners must continually sense changing points of physical strength and weakness (both in their 
own bodies and in that of their partner’s), sense the flow of kinetic energy, and remain aware of 
movement pathways that may be utilized in an efficient channeling of that energy.  Further, since 
movement is improvised and since verbal communication is generally discouraged, each partner 
must remain sensitive to the movement-intentions of the other so that the dance can unfold in a 
mutually cooperative manner (Novack 1990).   
CI is akin to Gaga technique in that it can be practiced by dancers and non-dancers and because it 
is as an improvisational dance process that provides a structure for the cultivation of somaesthetic 
experience in the studio that can be developed into choreography for the stage.  However, since 
CI entails working in close contact with a dance partner, the embodied investigation that it can 
advance differs from that of Gaga practice.  Specifically, CI offers an experiential investigation into 
the manner in which external physical forces can affect the moving body, into the manner in which 
the phenomenological boundary between self and other can be blurred, and into the manner in 
which cultural values inflect the experience of touch.    
Paxton referred to the practice as an experiential investigation into the kinetic physics of the 
human body (1975, 41).  In solo practice, one can develop an appreciation of the structural integrity 
of one’s frame in relation to the ground and to the force of gravity and in CI this appreciation is 
heightened since one’s physical structure unfolds in relation to a partner’s moving body.  That is, 
human movement is always a functional negotiation of the human frame and its musculature with 
the force of gravity and this negotiation is intensified when one begins to improvise in close contact 
with another body.  The negotiation is triangulated as I interact with the force of gravity and interact 
with physical forces that characterize my partner’s movement intentions.  This continually changing 
interaction encourages me to focus on the present moment and to become aware of the manner 
in which the kinetic capacities of our bodies can cooperatively relate to gravity and the ground.  
Here again we find a dance practice that experientially investigates a fundamental aspect of human 
embodiment.  Whereas Gaga allows the practitioner the chance to use the imagination to develop 
somatic textures in solo practice, CI allows her to investigate the structural integrity of the human 
frame as it interacts with that of another. 
While performing CI movement research the individual can enter into a flow state in which the 
boundary between the self and the other becomes less well defined (for more on this with regard 
to dance, see Fraleigh 1996, 57–70; Kozel 2007, 136–160).  There are several factors that play into 
this experience.  The first concerns the necessity of ongoing focused attention on improvised 
bodily experience in the present moment.  If one’s reflective mind takes one out of the experience 
of the present, CI provides immediate feedback since one will no longer be pre-reflectively 
responding the partner’s movement-intentions.  Reflection results in inappropriate physical 
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responses, missed opportunities for execution of efficient movements, and more generally a 
disruption of the kinetic flow of the interaction.  As with yoga and tai chi, a meditative focus on the 
body allows the preoccupations of the reflective mind to fall by the wayside and consequently 
allows one to stay present to the continually changing characteristics of the interaction.  CI is 
unique, however, in that close physical proximity contributes to the blurring of the boundary 
between self and other.  At a distance, my partner is a distinct embodied individual but as our 
bodies cooperatively move in contact we can experience moments in which intentions are 
effortlessly realized and the distinction between the doer and what is done momentarily dissolves. 
In this way CI provides the context for a unique experiential investigation into the possibilities of 
the self in physical activity (Cooper Albright 2011, 9–16).   
There are many factors that are necessary for the experience of improvised physical effortlessness 
with a partner.  Both partners must have a certain level of physical ability, must be sensitive to the 
movement-intentions of the other (e.g. must be continually “listening”), and must be attuned to the 
possibilities of the continually changing kinetic architecture that unfolds in relation to gravity and 
the floor.  Importantly, there must be a high degree of trust between the two partners as physical 
safety is always an issue.  Whenever I press weight into my partner I must trust that she will react 
in a way that counters my unstable and physically vulnerable position; counteracting it by pressing 
weight into me or by essentially catching me.  Further, since CI is an improvisation technique my 
shift of weight may very well be unexpected and I must trust that she is continually sensitive to my 
actions.    
A key component of CI is touch and in any culture there are norms surrounding acceptable touch, 
norms that center on social differences such as age, gender, sexuality, and social position.  Further, 
social context invariably inflects such norms.  Touch is generally minimized in professional contexts 
but often expected when intimacy is expressed in the privacy of the home.  There is much to say 
here but, for the sake of brevity, I will focus on social customs of touch that pertain to the male 
gender.  
Briefly, western cultures are characterized by specific norms concerning the manner in which men 
touch other men (Bordo 2000, 50–64).  When meeting an adult male for the first time one shakes 
his hand and, once a relational bond has been formed, possibly embraces him at particular times 
(e.g. during a celebration, bidding farewell, etc.).  Men can make physical contact within the context 
of physical competition as well.  They strike each other in different ways as they tackle or block 
each other or as they celebrate a successful play.  These examples demonstrate that contact 
between men generally has clear duration and degree of force.  A handshake or embrace should 
not last too long and contact should be characterized by firmness. 
Steve Paxton’s first explorations of CI were developed with male college athletes and the 
partnering was aggressively kinetic. However, in time, CI practitioners began to emphasize more 
effortless interactions which require a high level of physical relaxation, perceptual sensitivity, and 
a more generous touch in which any surface of one’s body can sensitively remain in contact with 
any surface of a partner’s body.  This kind of touch may not be problematic for dancers who have 
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a wealth of experience with dance partnering but it can be uncomfortable for non-dancers whose 
bodies have been, often unknowingly, inscribed by standards of appropriateness that centre on 
touch.  Specifically, it allows practitioners to consider how their sense of appropriate touch 
manifests values concerning gender and gender relationships which are the product of a process 
of enculturation that begins in early childhood and that is developed in a range of cultural 
institutions and settings across one’s life.  In this way CI offers a physical investigation into 
Foucault’s account of bio-power, that is, into the manner in which social values are, via habit, 
inscribed in the body and often unconsciously manifested in bodily attitudes and actions (2001).  
Though he does not discuss dance, Michel Foucault’s notion of “docile bodies” discussed in 
Discipline and Punish can be seen in the case of dance students.  Foucault discusses how the social 
power that characterizes particular social institutions such as the prison, school, or army barracks 
is internalized by the obedient bodies of inmates, students, and soldiers and dance scholars have 
noted that this also often pertains to students in the dance studio (Alterowitz 2014; Green 2003).  
Whereas codified dance technique taught in dance schools requires regimentation, examination, 
and clear social roles, CI demonstrates how a more collaborative improvisational dance practice 
can foster awareness of bio-power and, following Albright (2011), can provide a site of resistance 
to the techniques that render the body obedient to dominant social values (for more on dance 
practice and social resistance, see Albright 1997; Hall 2011; Summers-Bremner 2009).  In practicing 
CI, I can learn how pre-reflective bodily attitudes inflect the experience of touch and can practice 
developing new attitudes that are based not in dominant social values but in intentional 
experimental practice.  
I have considered how CI can lead one to self-reflectively consider the manner in which social 
norms foster a sense of appropriateness concerning embodiment, touch, and gender.  In addition, 
the experience of physically cooperative trust characteristic of CI grounds embodied investigation 
into ethical attitudes toward others.  Shusterman observes that bodily awareness can reveal ethical 
attitudes to others that are inconsistent with egalitarian values (2008: 5–7).  I may believe that, on 
principle, all human beings deserve equal ethical respect but come to realize that my embodied 
reactions to perceptions of otherness—whether rooted in gender, ethnicity, or sexuality—betray 
that belief.  I may notice feelings of physical discomfort, anxiety, or disgust arise as I encounter 
certain others thereby creating a dissonance between what I cognitively and physically believe.   
Iris Young (1990) and Susan Bordo’s (2004) work draws attention to social standards concerning 
gender, body morphology, and ability, standards which have implications in daily life, in the dance 
studio, and on the concert stage.  Those standards are relevant for the practice of CI since physical 
trust, for example, can be undermined by the internalized association of female gender and 
physical passivity.  Further, such standards are often codified in dance traditions that outline norms 
of partnering in which women are displayed and physically lifted by their male counterparts (Foster 
1998).  Consequently, a woman new to CI may not believe that she has the physical ability to 
support the weight of a partner and she may, because of an internalized association of the 
feminine with passivity, believe that it is inappropriate for women to actively partner another.  
Conversely, a male dancer may not be willing to trust a female CI partner by giving her his weight 
and may believe that it is inappropriate for him to be lifted. 
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CI provides a setting and techniques for experimentation with the capacities of bodily structure, a 
site of resistance to social standards concerning gender, and thereby allows for the gradual 
development of trust.  The dancers can learn of the manner in which the structural integrity of the 
body paired and proper movement pathways can—regardless of gender—support a great deal of 
weight.  In turn, this process can alert practitioners to habitual embodied reactions to perceptions 
of otherness that often belie ethical convictions and can foster change thereby contributing to a 
more robust egalitarian ethic.   
I have drawn on contemporary feminist philosophy in order to focus on social values and ethical 
attitudes associated with gender and ability, however, since CI is a physically cooperative activity 
that involves touch and the cultivation of trust, it can similarly be used to cultivate an embodied 
ethic that counters the tendency to react to perceptions of otherness.  Regardless of my partner’s 
ethnicity, sexuality, or political ideology, we can work to create the physical dynamic necessary for 
efficient partnering and in this way CI enacts an embodied ethics. 
Conclusion 
This article demonstrates that Gaga and CI do philosophy as they enact experiential and self-
reflective investigations into particular aspects of human embodiment.  Dance artists naturally 
strive to investigate what the medium of their art form can do since different modes of 
embodiment can translate into new approaches to choreography and dance aesthetics.  In this 
case, intentional embodied inquiry can procure new somaesthetic experience, foster awareness of 
social values that can inflect the experience of others, and foster an embodied ethics.  Since I have 
first-hand experience with the practices, I focused on Gaga Technique and CI, however, other 
improvisation techniques and choreographic processes used in the studio will ground other lines 
of embodied philosophical inquiry as will performance practices.  This philosophy of practice 
demonstrates that robust dance philosophy is inter-disciplinary in that it entails in-depth and 
detailed investigation into the wide range of activities developed by dance artists. 
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